Thursday, March 1, 2012

DTN News - AFGHAN WAR NEWS: Europe Remains Committed To Afghan Mission, Commander Admiral Stavridis Says

Defense News: DTN News - AFGHAN WAR NEWS: Europe Remains Committed To Afghan Mission, Commander Admiral Stavridis Says
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Lisa Daniel - American Forces Press Service
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - March 1, 2012: European countries strongly support continuing with the mission in Afghanistan despite violent uprisings there, and NATO is likely to continue its partnership with Afghanistan well past the end of combat operations, the alliance’s supreme allied commander for Europe said here.
Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, who also is commander of U.S. European Command, addressed Afghanistan and NATO and U.S.-European partnerships during testimony today before the Senate Armed Services Committee and yesterday before the House Armed Services Committee.
The admiral said he sees no reason to change the strategy in Afghanistan of transitioning security responsibility to Afghan forces in response to violent uprisings that began there last week after it was learned that some U.S. forces had inadvertently burned copies of the Quran.
“As I look at the broad sweep of our strategy there, I am convinced that we should continue with transitioning Afghanistan’s security to the Afghans,” Stavridis said. “In my conversations – I’ve had many over last week or so with senior leaders in the alliance – there’s solid support on the European side to continue with current strategy.”
Stavridis noted that about 150 demonstrations had left 30 people killed and 150 wounded. “That’s significant activity, but it’s been very much diffused around the country,” he said, adding that Marine Corps Gen. John R. Allen, commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has said he is pleased with Afghan security forces’ ability to contain the violence.
“If you step back and look at the larger progression in Afghanistan, I remain cautiously optimistic that we can succeed there,” the admiral said. Two years ago, when U.S. and British Marines moved into Marjah, there were 10 coalition troops to every Afghan soldier. Today, there are two Afghan soldiers for every coalition member, he said.
Stavridis said he expects Allen will lay out a “definitive track” in mid-summer for the drawdown of coalition forces. “It has to be conditions-based as we go forward,” he said.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has a “high-level goal” of signing a long-term strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, showing NATO’s “strong willingness to go forward,” Stavridis said. “I think we will see an enduring relationship between NATO and the Republic of Afghanistan,” he added.
Stavridis told the Senators he will provide them with a classified report on the recent violence in Afghanistan, and in response to a question, said the uprisings appear to be a combination of spontaneous demonstrations and Taliban-driven activity.
The admiral also spoke about the importance of U.S.-European partnerships, noting that European countries have 40,000 troops in Afghanistan and lead operations in the Balkans. Speaking to the need for a continued U.S. presence in Europe, he said, “It does matter that we continue to have Europe as our partner of first resort.”
However, he said, he repeatedly has urged European nations to spend more on defense capabilities. The United States spends about 4.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, he said, and members of the European Union have pledged to spend 2 percent of each of theirs, but only some are meeting that goal, with most spending only about 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, he said.
“They should spend more, and if they would spend more, it would permit the United States to spend less,” Stavridis said. “I think the United States should press this very hard.”
Also at the hearings, the general gave his assessment of NATO’s capabilities in cyber defense. “We are in the process of catching up,” he said. “We have hard work to do in cyber.”
NATO’s progress on cyber is evident at the recently created Cyber Center of Excellence in Estonia, and in a computer response center being added in the NATO headquarters building in Brussels, the admiral said. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Georgia have had “fairly severe” cyber attacks in recent years, he noted.
Cyber defense was included in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, and Stavridis said he expects it to be discussed at the upcoming summit.
European governments struggle with public-private cooperation on cyber defense just as Americans do, he said. “We have more thinking and talking to do within the U.S. military structure as to the precise authorities and structures” in U.S. Cyber Command.

*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Lisa Daniel - American Forces Press Service
*Speaking Image - Creation of DTN News ~ Defense Technology News 
*This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News 

DTN News - ROYAL FAMILY NEWS: Queen Elizabeth II, Camilla And Kate Visited Fortnum & Mason Store In London

Defense News: DTN News - ROYAL FAMILY NEWS: Queen Elizabeth II, Camilla And Kate Visited Fortnum & Mason Store In London
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith 
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - March 1, 2012:  Queen Elizabeth II, Camilla, Duchess Of Cornwall and Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge look inside their hampers filled with gifts while visiting Fortnum & Mason store on March 1, 2012 in London, England.

Together with Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall and Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, Queen Elizabeth II met military personnel and staff, viewed the store's Diamond Jubilee product ranges and unveiled a plaque for the restoration of Piccadilly.

*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith DTN News
*Speaking Image - Creation of DTN News ~ Defense Technology News 
*This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News 

DTN News - AIRLINES NEWS: Boeing, Air Astana Announce Order For Four 767-300ERs And Three 787 Dreamliners

Defense News: DTN News - AIRLINES NEWS: Boeing, Air Astana Announce Order For Four 767-300ERs And Three 787 Dreamliners
- Represents single largest order for commercial airplanes in Kazakhstan
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources Boeing
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - March 1, 2012: Boeing (NYSE: BA) and Air Astana have announced an order for four 767-300ERs (Extended Range) and three 787-8s. The order is valued at $1.3 billion at current list prices, making this the largest single order for commercial airplanes in Kazakhstan's history.
"Our decision to order the Boeing airplanes is part of Air Astana's long-term growth strategy to expand and modernize our fleet with newer, more fuel-efficient airplanes to serve domestic, regional and international routes," said Peter Foster, president, Air Astana.  "In addition, we want to offer an enhanced travel experience for our customers which we shall be able to do on these airplanes."          
In addition to bringing big-jet ranges to mid-size airplanes, the 787 provides airlines with unmatched fuel efficiency using 20 percent less fuel than today's similarly sized airplanes. Passengers will also see improvements on the 787, from an interior environment with higher humidity to increased comfort and convenience.  
The Boeing 767 family is a complete family of clean, quiet, fuel-efficient airplanes that provide maximum market versatility in the 200- to 300-seat market. Boeing has delivered more than 1,000 767s that are flown by over 120 operators around the world.
"We are extremely pleased that Air Astana has partnered with Boeing to participate in the region's growing air transport market," said Marty Bentrott, vice president of sales for Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, Boeing Commercial Airplanes. "Today, airlines are increasingly looking at lower operating costs and fuel efficiency without compromising on technological innovations and customer experience. We are confident that both the 767-300ER and the 787 Dreamliner will play an important role as Air Astana continues with its expansion plans."
Saffana Michael
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
+9 7150-4590651
Photo and caption will be available here:

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*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources Boeing
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*This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News 

DTN News - FUNDAMENTALS OF TERRORISM: Detection Points In The Terrorist Attack Cycle

Defense News: DTN News - FUNDAMENTALS OF TERRORISM: Detection Points In The Terrorist Attack Cycle
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Scott Stewart ~ Stratfor
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - March 1, 2012: Last week's Security Weekly discussed the fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different classes of actors and that, while the perpetrators and tactics of terrorism may change in response to shifts in larger geopolitical cycles, these changes will never result in the end of terrorism. Since that analysis was written, there have been jihadist-related attacks in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Yemen and Pakistan, an assassination attempt against the president of Abkhazia, and a failed timed-incendiary attack against the Athens subway. (The latter incident, which militant anarchists claimed, reinforces that jihadists are not the only ones who practice terrorism.)
But while terrorism is a continuing concern, it can be understood, and measures can be taken to thwart terrorist plots and mitigate the effects of attacks. Perhaps the most important and fundamental point to understand about terrorism is that attacks do not appear out of nowhere. Individuals planning a terrorist attack follow a discernable cycle -- and that cycle and the behaviors associated with it can be observed if they are being looked for. We refer to these points where terrorism-related behavior can be most readily observed as vulnerabilities in the terrorist attack cycle.

The Attack Cycle

Many different actors can commit terrorist attacks, including sophisticated transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda; regional militant groups like India's Maoist Naxalites; small, independent cells like the anarchists in Greece; and lone wolves like Oslo attacker Anders Breivik. There can be great variance in attack motives and in the time and process required to radicalize these different actors to the point that they decide to conduct a terrorist attack. But once any of these actors decides to launch an attack, there is remarkable similarity in the planning process.
First, there is the process of selecting or identifying a target. Often an actor will come up with a list of potential targets and then select one to focus on. In some cases, the actor has preselected a method of attack, such as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, and wants to find a target that would be vulnerable to that specific type of attack. In other cases, the actor will pick a target and then devise a method of attack based on that target's characteristics and vulnerabilities. Simply put, the execution of these steps can be somewhat fluid; some degree of planning or preparation can come before target selection, and sometimes target selection will be altered during the planning process. The time required to execute these steps can also vary considerably. Some attacks can be planned and executed within hours or days, while more complex plans, such as those used in the 9/11 or Mumbai attacks, may take months or even years to complete.
Frequently, those planning an attack will conduct detailed surveillance of potential targets to determine what security measures are in place around the target and to gauge whether they have the ability to successfully attack it. If the target is too difficult to attack -- commonly known as a hard target -- the attack planners will typically move on to their next target, which may prove easier to attack. (When they do continue with attacks against targets whose security measures exceed the attackers' capabilities, those attacks fail.) We refer to this stage as preoperational surveillance, which means surveillance that is conducted before the operation is fully planned.
After the target has been selected, a second round of surveillance is conducted. This round will be far more detailed and is intended to provide all the details necessary for planning the attack. For example, if the attack is being planned against a static facility, this round of surveillance will generally try to obtain a detailed description of the target's physical security features and security force procedures. It will also focus on establishing a baseline understanding of the activity that can be expected around the facility at the time of day the attack is anticipated.
If the target of the attack is an individual, the individual's residence, office and other places the individual frequents will be surveilled. Additionally, the surveillance team will look for patterns and routines that the target follows between these known locations. The team will often analyze the target's usual routes looking for choke points, or places the target must pass to get from one point to another. If the surveillance team identifies a choke point that the target passes through predictably, it will then try to determine whether that point will allow the attackers to deploy in secret, permit them to spot and control the target, and provide them with good escape routes. If it does, this point will frequently be chosen as the attack site.
In the case of large organizations, different groups or individuals may conduct different phases of the surveillance. Many organizations use specialized operatives for surveillance, though the operational planner will often attempt to get eyes on the target to help with the planning process. For instance, it is known from court testimony in the Mumbai case that David Headley made five extended trips to Mumbai as those attacks were being planned. The repeated trips were required because the operational commanders in Pakistan considered India a hostile environment and the operational planners could not go there to conduct the surveillance themselves. As a result, Headley was sent to observe and report on specific things as planning for the attacks progressed.
During the planning phase, the personnel to be used in the attacks are identified and trained in any special skills they may require for the mission, including languages, marksmanship, hand-to-hand combat, small-boat handling or land navigation. To protect operational security, the operatives may not be briefed in any great detail about the target of their operation until they are very close to being deployed.
Many times the planning phase will end with a dry run, as the preparation did for the 9/11 attacks, when some of the hijackers took their assigned flights in August 2001. While conducting a dry run, the attackers will generally be unarmed to ensure they do not needlessly bring law enforcement attention to themselves.
Sometimes an attacker will have acquired weapons for the attack before the planning phase. Other times the concept of the operation will be constrained by the weapons and money available. But quite frequently, the weapons for the attack will be acquired during the planning phase, after the target has been selected and the means of attack have been established.
Once planning, training and weapons acquisition are complete, the attack team can be deployed. The attack team frequently will again conduct surveillance of the target, especially if the target is mobile and the attack team is deployed and waiting at a predetermined attack site.
If it was properly planned, an attack is very likely to succeed once it has moved to the operational phase. Sometimes attacks do fail because of mistakes or bad luck, but by and large there is no way to stop an attack once it has been set in motion.
At the attack's conclusion, the attackers will seek to escape the scene. The exception is suicide attacks or when, like Breivik, the attacker intends to be captured as part of the media exploitation phase, the final step in the cycle.
Regardless of whether the attack is a suicide attack against a church in Nigeria or a timed-incendiary attack against a subway in Athens, the same attack cycle is followed. With an eye toward averting future attacks, a thoughtful observer can use the attack cycle model to understand how an attack was planned and executed.


While plots are occasionally thwarted at the last second, for the most part law enforcement and security personnel must detect and interdict the plot before it gets to the attack phase to have any chance of stopping it. Once the bullets fly or the explosive device is detonated, there is little security forces can do but initiate their immediate action drills in an effort to reduce the body count. This means that an emphasis must be placed on identifying attackers earlier in the process, well before they are in a position to strike.
Unless security forces have a source inside the group that is planning the attack or manage to intercept the group's communications, the only way to identify attack planners is by noting their actions. This is especially true of a lone wolf attack, where no external communication occurs. The earliest point in the attack cycle that the attackers can be identified by their actions is during the preoperational surveillance required for target identification.
There is a widely held conception that terrorist surveillance is generally sophisticated and almost invisible, but when viewed in hindsight, it is frequently discovered that individuals who conduct terrorist surveillance tend to be quite sloppy and even amateurish in their surveillance tradecraft. We will discuss what bad surveillance looks like, and how to recognize it, in more detail next week, but for now it is sufficient to say that poor surveillance tradecraft is a significant vulnerability in the terrorist attack cycle.
As noted above, additional surveillance is often conducted at later stages of the attack cycle, such as in the planning stage and even sometimes in the attack stage, as the attackers track the target from a known location to the attack site. Each instance of surveillance provides an additional opportunity for the assailants to be identified and the attack to be prevented.
During the planning phase and as the operatives prepare to deploy, communication between and movement of group members often increases. Additionally, group members may engage in outside training that can attract attention, such as playing paintball, visiting the firing range or, as was the case with the 9/11 pilots, attending flight schools. This increase in activity, which also might include money transfers, leaves signs that could tip off the authorities.
Another significant vulnerability during the attack cycle is weapons acquisition. This vulnerability is especially pronounced when dealing with inexperienced grassroots operatives, who tend to aspire to conduct spectacular attacks that are far beyond their capabilities. For example, they may decide they want to conduct a bombing attack even though they do not know how to make improvised explosive devices. It is also not uncommon for such individuals to try to acquire Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, automatic firearms or hand grenades. When confronted by this gap between their capability and their aspirations, grassroots operatives will often reach out to someone for help with their attack instead of settling on an attack that is within their ability. Increasingly, the people such would-be attackers are encountering when they reach out are police or domestic security agency informants.
As far back as 2010, jihadist leaders such as Nasir al-Wahayshi of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula recognized this problem and began to encourage grassroots jihadists to focus on conducting simple attacks against soft targets. Nevertheless, grassroots jihadists are consistently drawn toward spectacular attacks, as seen in the Feb. 17 arrest near the U.S. Capitol of a Moroccan man who thought his handler, who was in fact an FBI informant, had equipped him for a suicide attack. Unlike most jihadists, other types of grassroots militants, such as anarchists, are far more comfortable conducting simple attacks with readily available items.
Personality traits and psychological profiles aside, anyone desiring to plan a terrorist attack must follow the attack planning cycle, which at certain stages will necessarily open them up to detection.
*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources By Scott Stewart ~ Stratfor
*Speaking Image - Creation of DTN News ~ Defense Technology News 
*This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News 

DTN News - DEFENSE NEWS: U.S. DoD Awarded Lockheed Martin For Advanced Procurement Efforts Of $ 70 Million Related To C-130J Series Aircrafts For U.S. Air Force

Defense News: DTN News - DEFENSE NEWS: U.S. DoD Awarded Lockheed Martin For Advanced Procurement Efforts Of $ 70 Million Related To C-130J Series Aircrafts For U.S. Air Force 
Source: DTN News - - This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources DTN News, U.S. DoD issued No. 142-12 February 29, 2012 & U.S. AirForce - website
(NSI News Source Info) TORONTO, Canada - March 1, 2012:  Lockheed Martin Corp., Marietta, Ga., is being awarded a $70,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for advanced procurement efforts for the acquisition of two Air Force AC-130J, one HC-130J, and four MC-130J aircraft.  

The location of the performances is Marietta, Ga.  Work is expected to be completed during calendar year 2016. USAF/AFMC, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8625-11-C-6597 P00081).
Mission The AC-130H Spectre and the AC-130U Spooky primary missions are close air support, air interdiction and armed reconnaissance. Close air support missions include troops in contact, convoy escort and point air defense. Air interdiction missions are conducted against preplanned targets or targets of opportunity and include strike coordination and reconnaissance and armed overwatch mission sets.

FeaturesThese heavily armed aircraft incorporate side-firing weapons integrated with sophisticated sensor, navigation and fire control systems to provide surgical firepower or area saturation during extended loiter periods, at night and in adverse weather. The sensor suite consists of a television sensor, infrared sensor and radar. These sensors allow the gunship to visually or electronically identify friendly ground forces and targets any place, any time.

The AC-130U employs a synthetic aperture strike radar for long-range and adverse weather target detection and identification. The AC-130's navigational devices include inertial navigation systems and global positioning systems. Both of the AC-130s employ the latest technologies and can attack two targets simultaneously.

BackgroundThe Spooky (U-model) is the third generation of C-130 gunships. All gunships evolved from the first operational gunship, the AC-47

The AC-130 gunship has a combat history dating to Vietnam. Gunships destroyed more than 10,000 trucks and were credited with many life-saving close air support missions. During Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, AC-130s suppressed enemy air defense systems and attacked ground forces enabling the successful assault of the Point Salines Airfield via airdrop and air land of friendly forces. The AC-130 aircrew earned the Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner Award for the mission.

AC-130s also had a primary role during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989 when they destroyed Panamanian Defense Force Headquarters and numerous command and control facilities. Aircrews earned the Mackay Trophy for the most meritorious flight of the year and the Tunner Award for their efforts.

During Operation Desert Storm, AC-130s provided close air support and force protection (air base defense) for ground forces. Gunships were also used during operations Continue Hope and United Shield in Somalia, providing close air support for United Nations ground forces. Gunships also played a pivotal role in supporting the NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The AC-130H provided air interdiction against key targets in the Sarajevo area.

In 1997, gunships were diverted from Italy to provide combat air support for U.S. and allied ground troops during the evacuation of American noncombatants in Albania and Liberia. AC-130s were also part of the buildup of U.S. forces in 1998 to convince Iraq to comply with U.N. weapons inspections. More recently, AC-130U gunships have supported Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn while both aircraft have been employed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Finally, AFSOC gunships have also played a pivotal role in the recent uprisings in the middle east. Gunships provide armed reconnaissance, interdiction and direct support of ground troops engaged with enemy forces.

General Characteristics
Primary Function:
 Close air support, air interdiction and force protection
Builder: Lockheed/Boeing Corp.
Power Plant: Four Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engines
Thrust: 4,910 shaft horsepower each engine
Wingspan: 132 feet, 7 inches (40.4 meters)
Length: 97 feet, 9 inches (29.8 meters)
Height: 38 feet, 6 inches (11.7 meters)
Speed: 300 mph (Mach .4) (at sea level)
Range: Approximately 1,300 nautical miles; limited by crew duty day with air refueling.
Ceiling: 25,000 feet (7,576 meters)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 155,000 pounds (69,750 kilograms)
Armament: AC-130H: 40mm and 105mm cannons; AC-130U: 40mm, 105mm cannons and 25mm gatling gun.
Crew: AC-130H/U - pilot, co-pilot, navigator, fire control officer, electronic warfare officer (five officers) and flight engineer, TV operator, infrared detection set operator, loadmaster, four aerial gunners (eight enlisted)
Deployment Date: AC-130H, 1972; AC-130U, 1995
Unit Cost: AC-130H, $110 million; AC-130U, $210 million (fiscal 2010 constant dollars)
Inventory: Active duty, AC-130H, 8; AC-130U, 17; Reserve, 0; ANG, 0

*Link for This article compiled by Roger Smith from reliable sources DTN News, U.S. DoD issued No. 142-12 February 29, 2012 & U.S. AirForce - website
*Speaking Image - Creation of DTN News ~ Defense Technology News 
*This article is being posted from Toronto, Canada By DTN News ~ Defense-Technology News