Clifford Kupchan: The race will be close, but Mousavi has the upper hand

The head of the Russia and CIS team at Washington-based Eurasia Group and an analyst on Iranian issues, Cliff Kupchan shared his opinions with RIA Novosti on Iran's presidential elections scheduled for Friday.

What are your predictions for the presidential elections in Iran on June 12 between the two main candidates, current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi?
Iranian elections are extremely hard to predict because they are very competitive, but there is no reliable polling. That said, my instinct is that Mousavi will win in a second round runoff on 19 June. The Mousavi campaign has surged in the past two weeks, which is very important. [Mohammad] Khatami's win in 1997 and Ahmadinejad's victory in 2005 were both the result of late surges of support. Mousavi's "wave" is coming mainly from young voters, who comprise roughly 45% of the electorate. The vote is being delivered to Mousavi in large part by former President Khatami, who retains his extraordinary popularity with young voters. Also, Ahmadinejad in my view made serious mistakes in his 3 June debate with Mousavi, when he accused former President Rafsanjani of corruption and advisor to the Leader Nateq Nuri of living a lavish lifestyle. He also accused Mousavi's wife of improprieties in obtaining her academic degrees. Many Iranian voters and elites were offended by Ahmadinejad's remarks. But Ahmadinejad could win if [Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei decides to strongly support Ahmadinejad, and mobilizes voters who support him. And many Iranian experts believe the vote may be affected by some ballot stuffing and fraud, which would benefit Ahmadinejad. -- The race will be close, but Mousavi has the upper hand.
Does Mousavi have a chance at getting the office? If so, do you expect to see protests and disorder in the country?
I do think Mousavi has a good chance. If he wins, there may be some protests and violence by the paramilitary Basij and other radical conservative groups. I would not expect the protests to seriously interfere with Mousavi's ability to govern.
Do you think it will be a fair election?
That is a key question. The Leader or conservative forces can produce an unfair election -- by mobilizing certain constituencies, by ballot stuffing, and possibly by fraud.
What benefits would Mousavi bring to the world if he were to become president?
Mousavi would bring a number of important benefits. First, while he strongly supports the Iranian nuclear program, Mousavi would probably be at least somewhat more flexible on the issue -- and he would likely appoint more open-minded and creative nuclear negotiators. Iran will not cease uranium enrichment. But the chances of a deal on the nuclear program go up under Mousavi. Second, he espouses a policy of detente in foreign relations, which would help relax tensions in the Persian Gulf region and perhaps the entire Middle East. Third, he would not voice Ahmadinejad's comments about the Holocaust and Israel, which have offended the international community.
Since the U.S. has stated that it plans to move toward dialogue with Iran, could you argue or support both candidates' approach to such a dialogue? Will dialogue move forward with Ahmadinejad or will it be stagnant and a lot of tongue wagging? Will Mousavi be able to break ground in dialogue with Obama?
I believe that the US and Iran will engage in a dialogue regardless of who wins the election. The talks would be more promising if Mousavi wins. He will be beholden to Khatami, and is likely to appoint more liberal Khatami-era diplomats to key positions. I'd say there's a reasonable chance of a deal on the nuclear issue under Mousavi, though Iran's policy toward Israel and support for Hizbullah and Hamas will remain problems for some time. If Ahamdinejad wins, the talks will be tougher. My sense is that Ahmadinejad and his circle would like better relations with the US on selected issues -- Afghanistan and possibly Iraq. But I think Ahmadinejad will be less flexible on the nuclear issue.
How much power does the Iranian president really have? Or does much depend on the Leader?
The Leader makes final decisions in Iran. Ultimate power rests with Khamenei. But the president sets the tone of Iranian policy, and he has significant power on economic and social issues. The president also has an effect on the atmospherics of foreign policy, and plays an important advisory role. Iran's very different images under Khatami and Ahmadinejad show that who is president matters. Also, Ahmadinejad's aggressive style has in effect expanded the powers of the presidency -- he has carved out more freedom of maneuver for that office. Still, the Leader makes decisions on nuclear and foreign policy issues, not the president.
Could you discuss the "triangle" of misunderstandings with Iran in regard to U.S.-Russian-Iranian commitments? Especially in the US's demands in regard to Iran's nuclear program and Russia's support for Iran's program for peaceful purposes.
I think the main difference between the US and Russia on Iran is over the use of sanctions. The US thinks they can work, Russia believes sanctions won't work on Iran and could induce a belligerent reaction. I think that's an honest policy difference.
I also think both countries are comfortable with a purely civilian Iranian nuclear program. The US did not object very strongly to Bushehr, and the US together with the EU have offered to help Iran obtain light-water, energy-producing reactors.
Beyond that, I don't think the US and Russia are that far apart on the threat posed by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. Both countries recognize that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon in the not distant future, and that Iran is making progress on ballistic missile technology -- just having successfully launched a multi-stage, solid fuel missile. Increased bilateral cooperation on Iran is possible.
Interview by David Burghardt, RIA Novosti